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Abstract: This study empirically examines how the bank specific factors, macro-economic, and 
institutional variables impact interest margins in China’s banking sector. A panel data analysis of 
bank data for the period 1988–2015 was carried out. We found a significant association between 
credit quality, risk aversion, liquidity risk, and the proportion of corporate and industrial loans and 
the adjusted interest spread (AIS). GDP growth rate, inflation, and the proportion of national 
savings to the GDP were found to have significant association with the AIS. Furthermore, 
institutional variables were found to have a significant moderating effect on the AIS. We contribute 
to the literature by examining a unique context and a more accurate measure of bank interest margin 
not used in prior studies.  
Keywords: adjusted interest spread; corporate and industrial loans; financial freedom; monetary 
freedom; government spending; economic freedom 
 
1. Introduction 
What are the determinants of interest rate margin in Chinese banks? This is the question that we 
address in the present paper. Net interest margin (NIM) refers to the difference between the lending 
and deposit rates of banks (Birchwood et al. 2017). 
A study of interest margins is important because banks are dominant players in any economy 
and particularly, in developing/emerging countries, as banks are the main suppliers of finance. Bank 
net interest margin is also used as one of the prime indicators of competitiveness in the financial 
system (Murray Review 2014). Furthermore, interest margins are regularly watched by the central 
banks across the world. The Federal Reserve and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), for example, 
publish quarterly charts of bank interest margins (recent years have seen a general decline in bank 
interest margins in many countries). Interest margins are also important from the perspective of 
savings and investments as high interest margins can adversely impact these, particularly in 
developing economies where capital markets are not fully developed (Ben Khediri and Ben-Khedhiri 
2009). 
The Chinese context is important because of the dominance of state-owned banks (SOBs), a 
feature not seen in western economies, and as such presents unique issues not considered in prior 
literature that focused on developed countries. Second, the financial stability risks in China remain 
elevated. The level of debt in China has risen significantly over the past decade to reach very high 
levels, with particularly strong growth in lending from the less regulated and more opaque parts of 
China’s financial system’ (RBA 2017, p. 1). Third, the technology usage in banking in an emerging 
economy such as China is different from that of developed countries with mature technology. This 
can influence operating costs—one of the determinants identified in prior studies. China embarked 
on banking reforms, among others, to improve banking operations technology (Tan 2016) and reduce 
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operating costs. Lastly, as per RBA (2017), the interest margins in the US declined from nearly 4% 
(2000) to about 2.5% (2016), those of UK from close to 2% to 1%, Japan over 1% to less than 1%, and 
Australia from 3.7% to 2.3% in the same period. However, the bank interest margins in China which 
were close to 2.2% (2004), rose to about 3.7% (2014) during the study period (though stood at 2.7% in 
2016). The interest margins in China continue to remain high compared to other countries as above. 
Accordingly, China presents a unique case. As the banks in China largely depend on revenues from 
lending, the net interest margin is a crucial number (John 2017). The pressure on interest margins in 
China can be traced to tightening of regulations by China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
which required that banks fund two-thirds of their activities with stable deposits, tightened loan 
classifications, and mandated additional risk disclosures. The lack of competition from foreign banks 
incorporated in China—due to policy limitations—also impacted the interest margins. 
Against the above background, a study of the determinants of bank interest margins (as 
measured by the adjusted interest spread—AIS) in China assumes importance. To answer the 
research question indicated above, we examined the Chinese local and foreign banks data for the 
years 1988–2015. The fixed effect as well as the random effect models were tested. The study found 
that of the bank specific variables, such as credit quality, risk aversion, liquidity risk, and the 
proportion of corporate and industrial loans, had significant association with the AIS. The macro-
economic variables such as the GDP growth rate, inflation, and the proportion of national savings to 
the GDP exerted significant influence on the AIS. None of the institutional distance variables were 
found to be associated with the AIS, though these were found to have some significant moderating 
effects on the AIS. 
The present study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, the study provides 
evidence from the contextual uniqueness of China. Second, SOBs in China have access to cheap 
government equity in contrast to the private equity of banks in western countries which can impact 
interest margins as large non-interest-bearing funds (that is, government business) becomes available 
to them. Consequently, the interest margin determination models applicable in western countries 
may not be relevant in the Chinese context. Third, prior studies have used interest margin as the 
dependent variable but there are differences between interest margin, spread, and the adjusted 
spread, though the concepts are related (RBA 1994). ‘The difference between the measures will be 
larger if there are substantial non-interest-bearing deposits; in this case the spread will significantly 
underestimate the true difference between the average interest received and paid’ (RBA 1994, p. 1). 
Consequently, the RBA uses the AIS as the measure instead of the simple interest margin. The present 
study uses this more accurate measure as the dependent variable in contrast to prior studies. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the institutional environment as 
well as the interest rate environment in which the banks in China—whether local or foreign—operate. 
Section 3 presents a review of literature and describes the empirical model for interest margin 
determination used by us. Section 4 is about the data and method, Section 5 presents the empirical 
results and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Chinese Banking Industry: Institutional Setting and Interest Rate Liberalization 
The banking industry, as a major financial intermediary and a resource allocator in Chinese 
economy, has been undergoing substantial reforms over the last four decades. Despite these financial 
sector reforms, however, the Chinese financial market continues to be heavily regulated with limited 
links to the larger economy (Allen et al. 2017). 
Starting with a planned economy and a planned interest rate regime, China later adopted a 
gradual and cautious approach to liberalize interest rates. Though the central bank—the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC)—was established in 1984, deregulation of bank lending and deposit rates 
formally started after 1999 when the PBOC removed all restrictions on money market and bond 
market rates. In October 2015, the PBOC removed the deposit interest rate ceiling, paving the way 
for the full liberalization of interest rates. However, the PBOC will continue setting benchmark 
savings and lending rates for an unspecified period. So far, the Chinese banking system has largely 
focused on traditional financial intermediation between savers and borrowers. Consistent with this, 
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around two-thirds of Chinese banks’ income is generated by these activities (CBRC 2015). Further, 
Chinese banks command enough capital resources and have been able to transform most of the 
nation’s vast savings into deposits, and then into loans, most of which go to state-owned-enterprises 
(SOEs) (Liang 2016). The five largest state controlled commercial banks in China account for around 
one-half of Chinese banking system assets, and deposits contributed 85% of loans to SOEs in 2009 
(Grant et al. 2012; Cary 2013). 
Although the PBOC set the benchmark interest for deposit and lending activities, the actual rates 
set by individual banks could float within a small range around the benchmark rate. After 2000, the 
gap between the benchmark deposit rate and lending rate was almost fixed. Under these 
circumstances, the interest rate margins for the Chinese banks are protected. Banks can lock their 
profits for each dollar they lend due to this theoretically fixed interest margin. Consequently, prima 
facie, there would be little interest in studying bank interest margins in China. However, within the 
limits set by the PBOC, many factors do impact bank interest margins. What are these factors then? 
Do factors like size, proportion of non-performing loans, composition of assets and liabilities and 
others impact Chinese bank interest margins? 
Traditionally, the SOEs in China, whose loan requirement is very large, are supported by SOBs 
(Brandt and Zhu 2000). During the transition period, China adopted a dual interest rate system where 
under the SOEs can borrow at subsided rates from SOBs while the non-SOEs must pay the market 
interest rates (which is usually higher) to finance their investment projects (Chen 2002). The extent of 
the subsidy received by the SOEs can be gauged from the following. The borrowing rate for SOEs 
was about 2% while the average annual borrowing rates for SOEs would be 3.5% without state 
support based solely on their stand-alone profiles (The Economist 2016). It is also reported that SOEs 
account for over a third of domestic investment, and local governments account for 90% of all 
domestic fixed-asset investment in infrastructure. One of the major funding sources of the local 
government are bank loans (Allen et al. 2017). However, such loans also contribute to the high level 
of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the Chinese banking system. 
Foreign banks were permitted to operate in China after the banking sector reforms with the 
expectation that their presence would help enhance competitive efficiency and improve the structure 
of the country’s banking system (Leung 1997). According to the annual report issued by CBRC (2015) 
by the end of 2015, there were 37 wholly foreign-owned banks (with 306 branches under them), two 
joint-venture banks (with four branches under them), and one wholly foreign-owned finance 
company operating in China. However, there are some restrictions on the expansion of foreign banks. 
During the 1990s, foreign banks could only provide foreign currency loans and deposits to firms with 
foreign investment or to foreign individuals living in China. In December 2006, the Chinese 
government removed the geographical, clients, and currency restrictions on foreign banks and 
thereby sought to establish a level-playing field between foreign and local banks. Foreign banks, 
however, continue to face challenges as they are expected to provide credit for purposes such as 
agriculture and rural credit, or finance for small and medium enterprise (SMEs). However, such type 
of lending involves enormous risk especially because foreign banks may not have required insights 
in the local situation and cultural issues involved. As a result of these factors, though China has the 
largest banking sector in the world, foreign banks accounted for only 1.38% of the total banking assets 
in China as of December 2015 (a 0.35% decline compared to their market share in 2013). The lack of 
competition from foreign banks naturally influences overall bank interest margins. 
3. Literature Review 
Ho and Saunder’s (1981) seminal paper on the determinants of interest margin elucidates the 
theory and provides the evidence. The study integrated the expected utility theory and the hedging 
theory and drew on the literature on the bid-ask prices for security market dealers. The study found 
that the degree of bank’s risk aversion, the market structure in which the bank operates (that is, 
competition), the average size of bank transactions, and the variance of interest rates influence bank 
net interest margin. They found that even in highly competitive markets, interest margins can exist 
because of uncertainty in transaction which they call pure spread. 
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Following the work of Ho and Saunders (1981), many studies on bank interest margin 
determination were undertaken across the world, especially in Europe and North America. Angbazo 
(1997) found that interest margins are positively related to core capital, non-interest-bearing reserves, 
and management quality, but negatively related to liquidity. The Saunders and Schumacher (2000) 
seven-country study (did not include China) found that the regulatory components in the form of 
interest-rate restrictions on deposits, reserve requirements, and capital-to-asset ratios were the 
determinants. Maudos and de Guevara (2004) in the context of European banking found that market 
power, interest risk, credit risk, risk aversion, implicit payments, and operating costs were the 
determinants. Lepetit et al. (2008) in the study of 12 European countries found that interest margins 
were highly impacted by fee income. 
Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) presented a comparative analysis of the determinants of the 
bank interest margins in the Central and Eastern European countries and the Western European 
countries. These authors found, among others, that the presence of foreign banks reduces bank 
interest margins. Doliente (2005) examined determinants of net interest margins of banks in four 
South East Asian countries—Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and Malaysia—and found that bank 
specific factors (collateral, liquid assets, loan quality, operating expenses, and capital) were the 
determinants of bank interest margins in these countries. In their study of determinants of bank 
interest margins in Russia, Fungáčová and Poghosyan (2011) found that these were impacted by 
ownership type. 
Other studies on bank interest margin identified factors such as interest rate volatility (Angbazo 
1997; Saunders and Schumacher 2000; Valverde and Fernández 2007; Entrop et al. 2015), credit risk 
(Angbazo 1997; Maudos and de Guevara 2004; Hawtrey and Liang 2008), operating costs (Williams 
2007), and market power (Gischer and Jüttner 2003; Williams 2007). These researchers found a 
positive association between the above factors and interest margin. Some studies such as Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2004) and Carbo-Valverde and Fernández (2007), however, found that the 
association between market power and interest margin could be negative depending upon the state 
of institutional development of a country. 
There is limited literature on bank interest margins in China. Zhou and Wong (2008) examined 
the determinants of net interest margins of 81 Mainland Chinese commercial banks for the period 
1996 to 2003 and found that market competition, average-operating costs, degree of risk aversion, 
transaction size, implicit interest payments, opportunity cost of reserve, and management efficiency 
were the determinants of net interest margin of banks in China. Further, the study also examined the 
impact of economic freedom on the overall economic wellbeing (though not on the banking sector). 
Hongwei et al. (2008) found that net interest margin of Chinese bank was impacted by interest rate 
liberalization, capital adequacy norms, and regional operating restrictions. The Qi and Yang (2016) 
study found that foreign bank presence and short-term funding exercised negative impact on Chinese 
bank interest margin. García-Herrero et al. (2009) examined profitability of Chinese banks and found 
that better capitalized banks were more profitable. It was also found that the four SOBs were a drag 
on the overall banking system profitability. Sufian (2009) studied the profitability of Chinese 
commercial banks and found that it is positively associated with size, credit risk, and capitalization 
but has negative association with liquidity, overhead costs, and network embeddedness. 
We improve upon these studies in several ways: (a) we use the most complete data (1988 to 2015) 
of Chinese and foreign banks operating in China delete full stop (b) we use a more relevant measure 
of dependent variable, the AIS, to more appropriately capture the reality, and (c) we consider the 
influence that institutional factors as well as economic factors exercise on the AIS in respect of both 
domestic and foreign banks which has not been considered in prior studies. 
Following from the above literature, the general hypothesis is that the AIS is affected by a set of 
factors as presented below: 
AIS = f(bank specific factors; industry and macro-economic factors; institutional factors)  
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4. Variables, Data, and Method 
4.1. Dependent Variable 
Following from the RBA (1994), we used the AIS as a measure of the dependent variable as 
below: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 ሺ𝐴𝐼𝑆ሻ = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 −
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡. (1) 
4.2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables include bank specific factors, industry and macroeconomic variables, 
and institutional distance variables. 
4.2.1. Bank Specific Factors 
Bank specific variables as below have been frequently used in the literature. 
Size of operations: Compared to smaller clients or transactions, larger transactions reduce the 
frequency of operations and spread administrative overheads across a larger base, which reduces a 
bank’s operating expenses per dollar of revenue, hence, economies of scale exist (Hawtrey and Liang 
2008). Chinese SOBs can offer credit at narrower margins to large corporate clients such as the 
Chinese SOEs, for example, than what the smaller banks can offer. Accordingly, the logarithm of the 
volume of loans as the measure of size of operation is employed in the present study to capture the 
scale effects. 
Credit Quality: Credit quality (risk) is measured by the proportion of loan loss provisions to total 
loans indicating bank’s credit quality (Dietrich and Wanzenried 2011; Schwaiger and Liebig 2009). A 
higher ratio indicates a lower credit quality and therefore exercises a negative influence on the AIS. 
Risk aversion: Banks that are more risk-averse will charge higher margins (Maudos and de 
Guevara 2004). Following from McShane and Sharpe (1985) and Maudos and de Guevara (2004) we 
used the ratio of shareholders’ funds to total assets as a measure of risk aversion. 
Loan quality: The loan quality (as a measure of credit risk) is calculated as the proportion of non-
performing loans to gross loans. In theory, banks with higher credit risk are likely to adjust upwards 
their interest margins to cover the potential losses (Angbazo 1997; Mody and Peria 2004; Hawtrey 
and Liang 2008). 
Operational inefficiency: Higher operational ratio implies higher interest margins and is indicative 
of firm’s operational inefficiency. Following from Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Mody and Peria 
(2004), Maudos and de Guevara (2004), Zhou and Wong (2008), we included the operational 
inefficiency variable as a control variable in the bank interest margin modelling. We measured the 
operational inefficiency as the overhead expenses to average assets. 
Liquidity risk: In theory, holding higher proportion of liquid assets involves opportunity cost. 
Banks would pass this cost on to the borrowers and depositors. As a result, these costs need to be 
priced into the setting of interest margin (Kashyap and Stein 1995). 
Proportion of corporate and industrial loans: is proxied by the proportion of corporate and industrial 
loans to total loans to capture the effect of portfolio composition on the AIS. The highly profitable 
corporate loans segment is open for fierce competition and impacts spread. ‘Vigorous competition 
for new large corporate loans is being induced by the narrow spreads available on market-based 
funding, as well as the growing presence of a number of foreign banks, particularly Asian-owned 
banks, in the Australian business loan market’ (RBA 2015, p. 37). Memmel (2014) asserts that bank’s 
portfolio composition has a huge impact on net interest margins. 
4.2.2. Industry and Macroeconomic Variables 
Market share represents market power. It is measured as the proportion of bank assets to the 
total assets of the banking sector in the country. Higher market share represents higher market power. 
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The Hirschman–Herfindhal index (HHI) is used to calculate the degree of concentration in the 
banking industry. The market concentration indices exhibit the general form as below: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼௜ = ෍ 𝑠௜𝑤௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
, (2) 
where 𝐻𝐻𝐼௜ is the market concentration index for bank i, 𝑠௜ is the market share of bank i, 𝑤௜ is the 
weight attached to the market share, and n is the number of banks in the market in question. 
Macroeconomic environment is captured by the overall economic growth which is measured by 
GDP growth rate, and GDP deflator. Further, being one measure of domestic investment, national 
savings to GDP has important implications for the economy as well. 
4.2.3. Institutional Variables 
Four institutional distance variables are included in the study which are financial freedom 
distance, government spending distance, monetary freedom distance and government effectiveness 
distance. Economic freedom is an integrated index. One drawback is that a single measure may not 
be able to properly capture the overall economic environment faced by the bank. Furthermore, a 
highly aggregated index makes it difficult to draw policy conclusions. Therefore, we chose three sub-
categories that are related to bank operations and investigate their effects on the AIS. These variables 
are based on Fraser Institute’s (2017) economic freedom of the world annual reports, for the years 
under study, which measure a country’s openness to the other world. Financial freedom measures 
banking efficiency as well as independence from government control or interference in the financial 
sector. State ownership of banks is considered as a burden that adds to operational inefficiency. 
Government spending indicates the level of government contribution in the economy, and monetary 
freedom represents the price stability and liberalization. Each of these categories is graded on a scale 
of 0 to 100 with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. It is important to note that this study 
uses freedom distance values rather than merely the index per se as there are 39 foreign banks 
operating in China. ‘Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
such policies’ (World Bank 2019.). 
Foreign and domestic banks differ in their management strategies, clients, knowledge of the 
local market, international regulatory arbitrage, and international business platform. They face 
different kind of competitiveness in the banking market and different advantages in business 
operations (Elyasiani and Rezvanian 2002), which eventually affect their interest margins. 
Institutional distance refers to the relative distance between China and the home country of the 
foreign bank. It is calculated in the same way as the cultural distance is computed. Distance 
calculation, illustrated by cultural distance (Kogut and Singh 1988) is shown below: 
𝐼𝐷௝ = ෍
{൫𝐼௜௝ − 𝐼௜ை൯
ଶ
𝑉௜ }
4
ସ
௜ୀଵ
, (3) 
where IDj is the institutional distance between host country j and the other country, Iij is country j’s 
score on the ith institution dimension, IiO is the score of the other country on this dimension, and Vi 
is the variance of the score of the dimension. 
Finally, we included foreign banks in our dataset although the market share of these banks is 
very small in China. Empirically and theoretically, foreign banks have their competitive advantages 
compared to the local banks, for example, large asset base from the parent bank, international branch 
network, easy access to euro-currencies market, modern banking technology, and credit management 
practice etc. Foreign banks have more than doubled profits in 2011 to RMB 16.73 billion. They also 
expect to grow revenues by 20% over the next three years (PWC 2012). However, the expansion of 
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foreign banks is limited by relevant laws and regulations of the supervisory and regulatory 
institutions of China. 
Table 1 provides a description of all variables. 
Table 1. Description of variables. 
Dependent Variable Measure and Description 
AIS Measured as per formula indicated in this paper. Adjusted 
interest spread 
Bank specific variable  
Size of Operations Logarithm of total gross loans 
Credit Quality Provisional loan loss/total loans 
Risk Aversion Total equity/total assets 
Loan Quality Impaired loans (NPL)/gross loans 
Operational Inefficiency Overheads/average assets 
Liquidity Risk Liquid assets/the sum of deposits and short-term funding 
Proportion of Commercial and 
Industrial Loans 
 
Local or Foreign Bank 
Dummy variable that takes value of 1 for foreign banks, 
otherwise 0 
Portfolio composition variable  
Proportion of Corporate and 
Industrial Loans  Corporate and commercial loans/gross loans 
Industry and macro-economic 
variable 
 
Market Concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) index (total assets) 
Market Share Bank assets/total banking assets in economy 
Economic Growth Real GDP growth rate 
Real Interest Rate Real Interest Rate 
Inflation CPI growth rate, measurement of percentage change in 
consumer price index 
National Savings Proportion of national gross savings to GDP  
Institutional variable   
Financial Freedom Distance 
The difference between the host country’s (China) 
financial freedom index to the other 14 foreign countries 
and districts 
Government Spending Distance 
The difference between the host country’s (China) 
government spending level and the other 14 foreign 
countries and districts 
Monetary Freedom Distance 
The difference between the host country (China) monetary 
freedom index and the other 14 foreign countries and 
districts 
Government Effectiveness Distance 
The difference between the host country (China) 
government effectiveness index and the other 14 foreign 
countries and districts 
4.3. Data 
Our panel dataset consists of annual data for 192 banks over the period 1998–2015. This includes 
five large SOBs, 33 joint-stock commercial banks, 79 urban commercial banks, 32 rural commercial 
banks, 40 foreign banks, and three rural cooperative banks in six groups of banks. We excluded the 
central bank and the three policy banks from our sample. The main data source was Bankscope from 
Bureau van Dijk, which compiles data mostly from the balance sheet and income statement. Industry 
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and macroeconomic variables were obtained from the website of China Banking Regulatory 
Commission and the World Bank database such as the World Bank World Development indicators 
(WDI) database (World Bank 2017). The institutional variables were obtained from the Index of 
Economic Freedom report maintained by the Heritage Foundation (2018). 
Furthermore, we conducted a missing value analysis and identified variables that have many 
missing values. We omitted the cases that had common missing values across all the variables. With 
the remaining cases, the percentage of missing values across variables ranged from 1.3% to 10%, and 
we then conducted an imputation procedure with SPSS to systematically replace the missing values 
for all missing variables. In order to avoid possible effect resulting from differences in number of 
observations (sample size), we chose the lowest number of observations as the sample size for 
subsequent analyses, and deleted the rest of the cases. This left 1206 observations for all the variables 
in all the models. 
4.4. Methodology 
To choose the best method of conducting data analysis, a few diagnostic tests were employed. 
We used the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to choose between a random effects 
regression and simple OLS regression. The Prob > chi2 equals zero and as such there is evidence of 
significant differences across banks. Consequently, the random effects regression was run. To decide 
between fixed or random effects regression, the Hausman test was employed. It suggested that all 
models reject the null hypothesis (with Prob > chi2 = 0.000) which indicated that the fixed effect model 
is appropriate. The variable of Local or Foreign Bank was omitted due to collinearity, though it is an 
important variable we would like to investigate. Consequently, we considered Local or Foreign Bank 
as a moderating variable. The model is stated as below: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௜,௧
= 𝛼଴ + ෍ 𝛽 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠௞,௜௧
଼
௞ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠௅,௜௧
଺
௅ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠ெ,௜௧
ସ
ெୀଵ
+ 𝑢௜ + 𝜀௜௧, 
(4) 
where i = 1, 2, …, n, refers to banks, and t = 1, 2, …, T, refers to yearly time period during the period 
1988–2015. The 𝐴𝐼𝑆௜௧  is defined as the net interest margin for bank i at year t; 𝛼଴  represents the 
constant term. 𝑢௜ represents the time effects. 
Following from prior literature, bank specific variables include the size of operations, credit risk, 
risk aversion, loan quality, operational inefficiency, liquidity risk, proportion of corporate and 
industrial loans, and local or foreign bank ownership. 
Industry and macroeconomic variables include market concentration, market share, economic 
growth, economic growth inflation, real interest rate, and the proportion of national savings to the 
GDP. 
Institutional variables include financial freedom distance, government spending distance, 
government effectiveness distance, and monetary freedom distance. The value 𝑢௜  denotes the 
individual effect, which does not change with time. The coefficient β measures the sensitivity of each 
of these variables to the dependent variable. 
We estimated four models respectively. Model 1 includes all bank specific variables. Model 2 
includes industry and macroeconomic variables. Model 3 includes institutional variables. Model 4 is 
the full model with all the variables included. 
In order to understand the institutional factors better, we examined whether institutional 
distance between China and other countries will weaken or eliminate the effects on the AIS. 
Therefore, we included an interaction term between each of the three institutional distances and the 
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variable of local or foreign bank with each of the bank-specific factors in the model. Following Balli 
and Sørensen (2013), the model used is specified below: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௜,௧
= 𝛼଴ + ෍ 𝛽 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠௞,௜௧
଻
௞ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝛽 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠௅,௜௧
ଷ
௅ୀଵ
+ ෍ 𝛽൫𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟௅,௜௧
଻
ெୀଵ
− 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟തതതതതതതതതതതതതതത௅,௜௧൯൫𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒௄,௜௧
− 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝚤𝑓𝚤𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝚤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത௄,௜௧൯ + 𝑢௜ + 𝜀௜௧. 
(5) 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 provides the summary statistics on the variables used in the model. 
This table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum characteristics of all 
variables under consideration based on different groups of banks and on average. Overall, the mean 
value of the AIS for all the banks was approximately 2.967% and ranged from −1.30% to 11.125%. 
Size of operations is proxied by the gross loans. Apparently, SOBs control substantial operations 
in the banking sector. The loan loss provision relative to total loans, which is an indicator of the 
quality of the credit portfolio, has an average value of 0.73%, which is consistent across different 
groups of banks in our sample. On average, risk aversion was around 9.185%, with foreign-owned 
banks having the highest average value of 20.691%, suggesting that they are well-capitalized banks. 
Liquidity risk is similar for all the banks with an average percentage of 34.216. 
Notably, there is wide cross-bank variation in the sample with market power ranging from 
18.945% for five large SOBs to near 0% for foreign incorporated banks in China. 
China’s average inflation rate over the study period was 3.08%, and GDP growth averaged 
9.55%. Of the total loans, 76.366% went to the corporate and industrial sectors. Surprisingly, in a few 
cases the risk aversion ratios are negative. We found that four Chinese banks recorded negative 
equity in the years of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 respectively. These four banks are Agricultural 
Bank of China (NY −727,605 million in 2008); Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (CNY 
−535,844 million in 2004); China Resources Bank of Zhuhai (CNY −514.1 million in 2007); China 
Everbright Bank (CNY −5490.4 million in 2004; CNY −2550.8 million in 2005, CNY −182.5 million in 
2006). 
The negative equity condition could be traced to the bank making losses year after year and 
borrowed to fund non-performing loans. Consequently, the liabilities exceeded assets resulting in a 
negative equity. 
As the banking sector in China is largely government-owned, the negative equity was not 
considered to be a cause for worry as the government would recapitalize such banks out of the 
budget. In 1999, for example, to address the problem of non-performing loans, four asset 
management companies were established to take over the non-performing assets from the banks and 
sell them off to the investors. Despite being the major creditors in China, “Chinese banks seem to be 
unfairly neglected in the discussions on bankruptcy” (Wei and Chen 2018, p. 110). 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics. 
 
Adjusted 
Interest 
Spread 
Size of 
Operation 
(Millions 
CNY) 
Credit 
Risk (%) 
Risk 
Aversion 
(%) 
Loan 
Quality 
(%) 
Operational 
Inefficiency 
(%) 
Liquidity 
(%) 
Proportion 
of 
Corporate 
and 
Industrial 
Loan (%) 
Market 
Share 
(%) 
Market 
Concentration 
Real 
Interest 
Rate (%) 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
CPI (%) 
National 
Gross 
Savings 
to GDP 
(%) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Distance 
Government 
Spending 
Distance 
Monetary 
Freedom 
Distance 
Financial 
Freedom 
Distance 
Five Large State-Controlled Commercial Banks 
Mean 2.630 3,020,800.000 0.684 5.197 9.354 1.475 22.717 79.550 10.393 1303.039 2.229 9.559 4.154 44.739 0.033 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 0.877 2,759,870.000 0.317 2.877 10.906 1.322 12.014 11.773 3.815 380.534 3.404 2.252 5.634 5.399 0.175 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.628 18,549.500 0.055 −13.710 0.860 0.467 6.576 36.494 2.668 420.632 −7.977 3.907 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0 0 0 
Maximum 7.317 11,900,000.000 1.603 10.670 39.600 7.789 56.558 94.639 18.945 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 0.408 0 0 0 
Count 113 120 88 120 67 113 120 120 64 64 120 120 120 120 84 120 120 120 
33 Joint-Stock Commercial Banks 
Mean 2.793 354,602.200 0.572 7.547 3.761 0.015 34.019 76.643 0.977 1295.152 2.057 9.693 3.644 46.779 0.067 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 1.120 548,796.800 4.102 7.933 9.675 0.014 45.204 14.216 0.985 369.168 3.284 2.128 4.755 4.994 0.160 0 0 0 
Minimum −1.303 140.942 −69.186 −1.320 0.000 0.001 1.047 0.027 0.002 420.632 −7.977 3.907 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0 0 0 
Maximum 9.215 2,824,286.000 6.901 64.800 99.300 0.115 738.464 98.816 3.683 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 0.408 0 0 0 
N 366 384 299 383 254 341 384 384 273 273 384 384 384 384 316 384 384 384 
79 Urban Commercial Banks 
Mean 3.270 42,560.430 0.917 6.260 2.786 0.012 25.991 81.374 0.100 1301.168 1.988 9.666 2.680 48.801 0.089 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 1.309 69,869.060 0.682 2.398 6.919 0.004 11.524 11.785 0.134 365.298 2.687 2.075 2.237 3.590 0.138 0 0 0 
Minimum 0.208 10.992 −0.185 −6.420 0.000 0.005 2.643 10.495 0.000 420.632 −7.977 6.900 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0 0 0 
Maximum 11.125 775,390.000 5.863 23.590 100.000 0.035 71.378 98.853 0.009 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 0.408 0 0 0 
Count 767 786 701 786 559 670 777 786 717 717 786 786 786 786 756 786 786 786 
32 Rural Commercial Banks 
Mean 3.240 57,826.340 0.948 6.656 3.697 0.012 28.859 81.219 0.118 1231.346 1.848 9.306 3.016 49.902 0.112 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 0.992 59,488.730 0.821 2.389 4.815 0.003 13.370 12.499 0.110 352.001 2.666 2.028 1.718 1.526 0.127 0 0 0 
Minimum 1.184 1393.303 −0.827 0.530 0.340 0.006 2.454 35.730 0.006 420.632 −2.335 6.900 −0.766 39.832 −0.120 0 0 0 
Maximum 5.936 297,325.700 6.620 12.220 22.990 0.023 64.169 97.933 0.365 1794.081 5.451 14.231 5.864 51.966 0.408 0 0 0 
Count 165 170 147 170 108 136 170 170 169 169 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
40 Foreign-Owned Banks 
Mean 2.382 20,992.120 0.380 20.691 1.775 0.016 60.986 59.990 0.042 1233.020 2.075 9.258 2.920 49.416 1.469 1.643 0.768 5.265 
Std. Dev. 1.005 29,208.750 1.084 16.780 7.464 0.008 70.852 23.065 0.054 379.234 2.899 2.001 2.497 2.953 0.565 3.001 0.764 3.423 
Minimum 0.031 15.000 −7.450 4.740 0.000 0.003 11.258 0.229 0.000 420.632 −7.977 6.900 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 7.417 174,758.500 7.616 94.710 79.890 0.060 897.637 97.773 0.269 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 2.437 12.251 3.796 9.896 
Count 329 330 311 332 216 280 329 332 312 312 332 332 332 332 321 332 332 332 
Three Rural Cooperative Banks 
Mean 4.709 21,312.510 1.277 10.644 1.120 0.016 29.251 95.019 0.025 1008.478 2.414 8.243 3.013 49.551 0.137 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 1.950 7617.206 0.270 0.667 0.486 0.003 8.045 2.890 0.008 263.470 2.628 1.222 1.362 0.817 0.153 0 0 0 
Minimum 1.953 11,295.000 0.984 8.920 0.580 0.010 14.407 89.094 0.015 420.632 −1.472 6.900 1.437 48.393 0.004 0 0 0 
Maximum 7.180 33,225.300 1.726 11.230 2.060 0.019 39.065 97.639 0.033 1394.735 4.732 10.636 5.411 51.497 0.408 0 0 0 
Count 10 10 6 10 9 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Total 192 Banks 
Mean 2.967 305,048.200 0.734 9.185 3.242 0.014 34.216 76.366 0.671 1276.889 2.024 9.548 3.062 48.321 0.352 0.303 0.141 0.970 
Std. Dev. 1.227 1,055,552.000 1.949 9.956 7.915 0.009 40.189 17.040 2.231 368.914 2.908 2.084 3.277 4.074 0.615 1.436 0.443 2.514 
Minimum −1.303 10.992 −69.186 −13.710 0.000 0.001 1.047 0.027 0.000 420.632 −7.977 3.907 −1.408 36.459 −0.349 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 11.125 11,900,000.000 7.616 94.710 100.000 0.115 897.637 98.853 18.945 1794.081 7.348 14.231 24.237 51.966 2.437 12.251 3.796 9.896 
Count 1750 1800 1552 1801 1213 1548 1790 1802 1545 1545 1802 1802 1802 1802 1657 1802 1802 1802 
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Following Maudos and de Guevara (2004), we measured the degree of market concentration by 
HHI in each year for the 16-year period. As Figure 1 shows, the market concentration measured by 
HHI declined after 2007, indicating growing competition among China’s banks. Yet, this competition 
did not exercise any significant influence on the AIS. The overall trend of the AIS is upward despite 
some fluctuations as can be seen from Figure 2. These two figures confirm the negative relationship 
between market concentration and the AIS. It suggests that interest rate liberalization did not per se 
help reduce net interest margins but forced the bank managements to change their existing business 
models following increased fluctuations in interest rates. 
 
Figure 1. Mean market concentration of Chinese banks over the years until 2015. 
 
Figure 2. Mean adjusted interest spread of Chinese banks over the years until 2015. 
5.2. Correlation Coefficient between Variables 
Table 3 highlights the pair-wise correlations between all variables. It is noteworthy that the 
government effectiveness distance is highly correlated with financial freedom distance (0.8082), and 
foreign bank is highly correlated with financial freedom (0.8417), which is natural as foreign banks 
enjoy higher degree of financial freedom. Economic growth measured by GDP is highly correlated 
with market concentration (0.8174). 
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Table 3. Correlation coefficient between variables. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
AIS  (1) 1                   
Size of Operations (2) −0.059 * 1                  
Credit Quality (3) 0.076 * 0.073 * 1                 
Risk Aversion (4) −0.002 −0.525 * −0.206 * 1                
Loan Quality (5) −0.138 * 0.037 0.081 * −0.037 1               
Operational Inefficiency (6) 0.114 * −0.151 * −0.018 0.250 * −0.006 1              
Liquidity Risk (7) −0.050 * −0.362 * −0.156 * 0.608 * −0.085 * 0.181 * 1             
Proportion of Corporate  
and Industrial Loan  
(8) 0.349 * 0.124 * 0.017 −0.247 * 0.080 * −0.076 * −0.255 * 1            
Local or Foreign Bank (9) −0.227 * −0.337 * −0.085 * 0.519 * −0.084 * 0.147 * 0.308 * −0.433 * 1           
Market Share (10) −0.076 * 0.587 * −0.009 −0.120 * 0.116 * −0.054 * −0.099 * 0.102 * −0.138 * 1          
Market Concentration (11) −0.197 * −0.203 * −0.046 −0.045 0.108 * 0.082 * −0.017 0.104 * −0.060 * 0.033 1         
Real Interest Rate (12) −0.009 0.080 * 0.015 0.031 0.038 −0.035 −0.012 −0.007 0.012 −0.017 −0.558 * 1        
GDP Growth Rate (13) −0.183 * −0.168 * −0.040 −0.055 * 0.093 * 0.022 −0.017 0.040 −0.070 * 0.030 0.817 * −0.570 * 1       
Inflation (14) 0.105 * −0.037 0.005 0.002 −0.141 * 0.173 * 0.051 * −0.099 * −0.040 −0.016 0.269 * −0.724 * 0.327 * 1      
National Gross  
Savings to GDP (15) 0.155 * 0.003 0.008 0.010 −0.331 * −0.176 * −0.004 0.036 0.142 * −0.069 * 0.422 * −0.312 * 0.208 * 0.008 1 
    
Government Effectiveness  
Distance 
(16) −0.199 * −0.247 * −0.087 * 0.357 * −0.111 * 0.135 * 0.235 * −0.444 * 0.878 * −0.120 * −0.021 −0.015 −0.038 −0.020 0.153 * 1    
Government Spending  
Distance 
(17) −0.171 * −0.184 * −0.057 * 0.269 * −0.052 0.107 * 0.1847 * −0.334 * 0.460 * −0.065 * −0.019 −0.008 −0.024 −0.010 0.075 * 0.356 * 1   
Monetary Freedom  
Distance (18) −0.195 * −0.119 * −0.060 * 0.186 * −0.093 * 0.044 0.129 * −0.260 * 0.697 * −0.095 * −0.016 0.003 −0.025 −0.026 0.152 * 0.734 * 0.186 * 1 
 
Financial Freedom  
Distance (19) −0.163 * −0.259 * −0.060 * 0.347 * −0.101 * 0.145 * 0.232 * −0.391 * 0.842 * −0.115 * −0.078 * 0.013 −0.080 * −0.028 0.131 * 0.808 * 0.336 * 0.599 * 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
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The high national gross savings rate (the proportion of national savings to the GDP) comes from 
China’ high trade surpluses, which results in an economy driven by investment rather than domestic 
consumption. Bosworth (2014) pointed out that higher national savings rate relative to domestic 
investment will reduce domestic interest rates. 
Another factor behind the negative relationship is that China controls its interest rate, and 
investors have very limited financial instruments to invest. Hung and Qian (2013) suggest that 
emerging economy like China will keep real interest rates low to force the national saving rate to rise 
in order to provide cheap credit to industries. 
The correlation coefficient is further checked with the variance inflation factor (VIF) when 
performing the regression analysis procedures for Model 4. The VIF signifies the degree to which 
each independent variable is explained by the other independent variable, and all variables are found 
well below the suggested cut-off point of 10 (Hair et al. 1998). The variable of local or foreign bank 
was found to be highly correlated to the other independent variables and was omitted from analysis. 
5.3. Fixed Effects Regression Results for AIS 
We interpret the results based on the fixed effects regression analysis for all the models. The 
results are exhibited in Tables 4–7. 
Table 4. Fixed effects regression results: adjusted interest spread (AIS) as the dependent variable. 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Bank Specific Variables     
Size of Operations 0.0453   0.0598 
 (0.107)   (0.108) 
Credit Quality 11.64 ***   12.42 *** 
 (4.017)   (3.998) 
Risk Aversion 0.0477 ***   0.0466 *** 
 (0.00977)   (0.00993) 
Loan Quality 0.00110   −0.000120 
 (0.00254)   (0.00141) 
Operational Inefficiency 30.57 *   30.18 * 
 (15.67)   (15.80) 
Liquidity Risk −0.0106 ***   −0.0105 *** 
 (0.00199)   (0.00200) 
Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans 1.550 ***   1.658 *** 
 (0.283)   (0.265) 
Industry and Macro-economic Variables     
Market Share  2.904  2.792 
  (2.613)  (2.222) 
Market Concentration  −0.000210  −0.000720 
  (0.000473)  (0.000457) 
Real Interest Rate  0.119  0.170 
  (0.155)  (0.140) 
GDP Growth Rate  0.696  1.217 *** 
  (0.433)  (0.414) 
Inflation  −0.0668  −0.170 *** 
  (0.0467)  (0.0523) 
Proportion of national savings to the GDP  0.221 **  0.243 *** 
  (0.0858)  (0.0772) 
Institutional Variables     
Government Effectiveness Distance   0.0964 −0.0184 
   (0.152) (0.142) 
Government Spending Distance   −0.205 0.000996 
   (0.146) (0.0848) 
Monetary Freedom Distance   −0.107 −0.126 
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   (0.105) (0.0990) 
Financial Freedom Distance   0.000892 −0.0542 
   (0.0353) (0.0411) 
Constant 0.210 −12.91 ** 2.810 *** −19.82 *** 
 (0.814) (5.004) (0.0948) (5.388) 
Observations 1206 1206 1206 1206 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.491 0.363 0.363 0.494 
Number of Banks 172 172 172 172 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
5.3.1. Bank Specific Factors and AIS 
Results from Models 1 and 4 (refer to Table 4) show that four of the bank specific factors are 
important determinants of the AIS. Loan loss provisions over total loans is a measure of a bank’s 
credit quality. The coefficient of this variable is positive and significant which indicates that higher 
loan loss provision leads to higher AIS. This result is consistent with Poghosyan (2012) that banks are 
expected to require higher interest margins to compensate for funding riskier projects, and to 
maintain adequate loan reserves. Marinkovic and Radovic (2014) note ‘at least for existing loan 
customers, if possible, banks will re-price existing loans as they become due or when they are 
renegotiated. This will generate a positive relation between default risk and the NIM, ceteris paribus’. 
The coefficient of risk aversion is positive and significant, suggesting that Chinese banks are 
imposing an extra bank interest margin as a compensation for taking systematic risk. Similar results 
are reported by Ho and Saunders (1981) and Williams (2007) for the Australian banking sector. 
Meanwhile, operational inefficiency has a positive relationship with the AIS (marginally at 10%), 
indicating banks with higher operating cost will have higher AIS than banks with lower operating 
costs by providing their intermediation services. Birchwood et al. (2017) have similar findings in the 
context of banks in Central America and the Caribbean. 
The variable of liquidity risk is significant and negatively associated with the AIS. This result is 
not consistent with the literature that banks with higher risk on their credit books are likely to adjust 
upwards their interest margins to cover expected losses arising from default, when compared to the 
banks with lower credit risk (Angbazo 1997; Mody and Peria 2004). It is also contradictory with the 
results from Birchwood et al. (2017). The result indicates that Chinese banks holding large liquid 
assets to meet either regulatory requirements or depositors’ withdrawals, failed to price this factor in 
their interest margins. The SOBs also get flushed with large cash deposited by SOEs unless they can 
find avenues for interbank lending. 
Results from Models 1 and 4 also reveal that banks with a higher proportion of corporate and 
industrial loans generate higher AIS. These results are quite consistent with the condition of lending 
and deposits rate policies in China. These assets comprised mostly of financial securities. 
Furthermore, deposit interest rate in China averaged 1.16% from 1990 until 2018, reaching an all-time 
high of 3.15% in July of 1993 and a record low of 0.35% in July of 2012 (Trading Economics 2012). The 
low deposit rate would have resulted in higher AIS. 
5.3.2. Industry and Macroeconomic Variables and AIS 
Regarding the industry and macro-economic factors, Models 3 and 4 show positive and 
significant effects of GDP growth rate, and the proportion of national savings to the GDP to the AIS. 
It could be because Chinese banks can take deposits from households with an artificially low level of 
interest and transfer or subsidize the corporate sector, particularly the SOEs. Bank performance was 
found to be positively related to the overall economic development in China which is consistent with 
the theory that high net interest margin is associated with a high rate of GDP especially in developing 
countries (Gelos 2009; Tan and Floros 2012). 
5.3.3. Institutional Variables and AIS 
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Finally, the level of difference in government spending, and monetary freedom between home 
country China and foreign countries are not significant as can be seen from Model 3 in Table 4. Over 
the years, Chinese governments have been borrowing heavily and the related government securities 
such as complex off-balance-sheet structures are developed by banks to avoid tightening regulations 
that restrict bank loans to local governments (Wu 2015). Hence, some of these assets appear as 
investments rather than loans on the balance sheet, and apparently these investments failed to 
produce good return to banks. 
Results from Model 3 reveal that the level of difference in monetary freedom between home 
country China and foreign countries is not significant. Over the years, both central and local Chinese 
governments borrowed funds to finance government projects. Banks invest in treasury bills which 
are issued by the government to raise short-term debt. Domestic banks have a tradition that they 
would lend the money to SOEs and the government rather than to the private sector for various 
reasons. Moreover, both the government and the SOEs would receive cheaper finance to fund their 
projects. Treasury bills being risk free typically pay much lower interest rate than the market rate 
which in turn could impact the bank interest margin. 
The time-invariant variable of foreign bank or local bank was omitted from the fixed-effect 
model due to collinearity. In order to understand the relationship between this independent variable 
and the AIS, we adopted the approach of Pesaran and Zhou (2018) to identify and estimate the effects 
of this time-invariant variable. It yielded the following results: coefficient of the variable (−0.583), 
standard error (0.320), and t-value (−1.82). These estimations indicate that foreign banks operating in 
China have lower AIS compared to local Chinese banks. This result is generally consistent with 
Williams (2007) in the context of the Australian banking sector. 
Building upon the Models 3 and 4 in Table 4, Tables 5–7 report the results of the interaction of 
financial freedom distance, monetary freedom distance, and government effectiveness distance with 
each of the bank specific variables. 
Table 5. The moderating effect of government effectiveness and the impact of AIS. 
Variables Model 1 
Bank Specific Variables  
Size of Operations −0.0424 
 (0.135) 
Credit Quality 11.44 *** 
 (4.118) 
Risk Aversion 0.0365 *** 
 (0.00912) 
Loan Quality 0.00243 
 (0.0212) 
Operational Inefficiency 33.38 *** 
 (12.66) 
Liquidity Risk −0.00908 *** 
 (0.00191) 
Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans 1.659 *** 
 (0.271) 
Moderator  
Government Effectiveness Distance 2.683 
 (8.815) 
Interaction Term  
Government Effectiveness Distance × Size of Operations −0.110 
 (0.0935) 
Government Effectiveness Distance × Credit Quality −2.243 
 (3.754) 
Government Effectiveness Distance × Risk Aversion −0.00731 
 (0.00601) 
Government Effectiveness Distance × Loan Quality 0.000908 
 (0.0213) 
Government Effectiveness Distance × Operational Inefficiency 4.224 
 (7.880) 
Government Effectiveness Distance × Liquidity Risk 0.00179 
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2019, 12, 121 16 of 21 
 (0.00134) 
Government Effectiveness Distance × Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans −0.427 *** 
 (0.153) 
Constant −1.686 
 (8.535) 
Observations 1206 
Number of Banks 172 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.501 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01. 
Table 6. The moderating effect of financial freedom and the impact of AIS. 
Variables Model  
Bank Specific Variables  
Size of Operations 0.0390 
 (0.112) 
Credit Quality 12.30 *** 
 (4.314) 
Risk Aversion 0.0391 *** 
 (0.0120) 
Loan Quality 0.00491 
 (0.00532) 
Operational Inefficiency 30.17 * 
 (16.17) 
Liquidity Risk −0.0101 *** 
 (0.00196) 
Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans 1.836 *** 
 (0.311) 
Moderator  
Financial Freedom Distance 0.134 
 (2.891) 
Interaction Term  
Financial Freedom Distance × Size of Operations −0.0347 
 (0.0306) 
Financial Freedom Distance × Credit Quality −1.313 
 (0.993) 
Financial Freedom Distance × Risk Aversion −0.00275 
 (0.00259) 
Financial Freedom Distance × Loan Quality 0.00413 
 (0.00588) 
Financial Freedom Distance × Operational Inefficiency 1.284 
 (2.642) 
Financial Freedom Distance × Liquidity Risk 0.00110 * 
 (0.000586) 
Financial Freedom Distance × Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans −0.119 * 
 (0.0697) 
Constant 0.118 
 (2.816) 
Observations 1206 
Number of Banks 172 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.499 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 7. The moderating effect of monetary freedom and the impact of AIS. 
Variables Model 1 
Bank Specific Variables  
Size of Operations −0.0185 
 (0.175) 
Credit Quality −1.874 
 (5.428) 
Risk Aversion 0.0479 *** 
 (0.0104) 
Loan Quality 0.0123 
 (0.0213) 
Operational Inefficiency 38.65 *** 
 (13.24) 
Liquidity Risk −0.00120 
 (0.00341) 
Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans 1.225 *** 
 (0.354) 
Moderator  
Monetary Freedom Distance −5.026 
 (17.70) 
Interaction Term  
Monetary Freedom Distance × Size of Operations −0.0798 
 (0.132) 
Monetary Freedom Distance × Credit Quality −15.81 ** 
 (7.007) 
Monetary Freedom Distance × Risk Aversion 0.00498 
 (0.0153) 
Monetary Freedom Distance × Loan Quality 0.0113 
 (0.0221) 
Monetary Freedom Distance × Operational Inefficiency 11.03 
 (16.25) 
Monetary Freedom Distance × Liquidity Risk 0.0107 *** 
 (0.00390) 
Monetary Freedom Distance × Proportion of Corporate and Industrial Loans −0.602 * 
 (0.355) 
 (0.373) 
Constant 5.573 
 (17.79) 
Observations 1206 
Number of Banks 172 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.499 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Results from Tables 5–7 show that the coefficients of financial freedom distance, monetary 
freedom distance, and government effectiveness distance variables are not significant. Results from 
Tables 5–7 also show that these three institutional variables interact with credit quality, liquidity risk, 
and proportion of corporate and industrial loans leading to lower AIS. These results suggest that 
when the distance in institutional factor is high, the expected and potential positive relationship 
between the AIS and credit risk and proportion of corporate and industrial loan will be strengthened. 
These results support that institutional factors have a significant moderating effect on the AIS. 
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5.4. Robustness Tests 
To guarantee the robustness of our empirical results, we conducted robustness tests using 
various methods. First, we replaced our dependent variable with net interest margin and interest 
spread. Second, we dropped the data before 2006 (due to lack of observations on some of the 
variables) and focused on the sample data between 2007 and 2015. Third, we grouped the data based 
on the size of the banks, namely, large and small. 
These robustness tests confirm our main findings in Tables 4–7, thus indicating that our results 
are robust. The robustness test results are available upon request from the authors. 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to develop our understanding of the determinants of bank interest 
margins in China. Prior studies are generally confined to western countries. In China, the state-
owned-banks dominate the sector. Consequently, China provides a unique context for the study. The 
data of Chinese banks over the period 1988–2015 were analyzed. 
The study found that five bank specific variables—credit quality, risk aversion, liquidity risk, 
and proportion of corporate and industrial loans—significantly affected the adjusted interest spread. 
We found that macro-economic variables such as GDP growth rate, inflation, and the proportion of 
national savings to the GDP have significant association with the AIS. None of the institutional 
variables had any significant association with the AIS. 
The bank competition in China has increased after the (WTO) agreement, and the relaxation of 
policies applied to foreign banks operating in China. Yet, the AIS or net interest margin for Chinese 
banks are not under pressure following higher foreign counterparts’ competition. This scenario is in 
divergence with the literature. Overall, China’s banking sector is still operating in a relatively 
restricted environment, and free market pricing mechanism is not yet present. The government is 
subsidizing the stated owned enterprises by offering a lower deposit rate. 
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